

C-II CHRON

EXCOM II

Oct 23 Ship Kimout carefully picked as "right one."

[Consider blockade path if Sovs hadn't turned back.]

Pres asked <sup>SC</sup> analysis of effects of blockade - not food + medicine - on Cuba, and comparable analysis of effects of comparable blockade of Berlin.

Contingency Plan for shootdown of U-2. Pres informed  
that SAC/OSO channels; if clear indication result of  
hostile action, recommendation for immediate retal. or most  
likely SAM involved. Defense to have capability to hit  
site (8 planes) within 2 hours of event (SAC to inform  
Pres max 15-min from event. [Anderson?])

In Pres absence, SecDef authorized to act only if <sup>hostile</sup> U-2  
shootdown is very clear. Expected, but not definitely decided,  
that if hostile actions continue after initial., action against  
SAM system would become necessary.

Disc. of possible reaction in Berlin.

Pres indicated he would wish to consider whether additional law inspection of convoys would be acceptable.

(after meeting)  
(Ritzel designated Ch. for Berlin Contingencies)

(Ritzel raised this meeting?)

#2, 6M Oct 23

Ritzel invited to sit with ExCom as subcom. chairman

Subcommittees? a) Thompson Ambassadors Group ?

b) Boston Forward Planning Group

c) Ketchum - Ben. Riley Operation Planning Group ?

d) Ritzel: Berlin

e) Common: Vienna, Project

#3 10AM Oct 24

In middle of meeting, reported that certain law ships had appeared to have stopped or turned back; Pres directed no more intervention of any target for at least another hour until closer info sought.

(earlier) SecDef noted presence of subs near non  
hostile ships; use of dealing with subs; might have  
to destroy.

---- Some ships turning back; give them every opportunity to  
turn back.

| Strong affirmation by Secretary to keep objectives in mind:  
Turn Back Ships, not capture.

[?] [Had blockade "achieved its purpose" by late

24 Oct? ~~Never~~, caution in interrupting?]

#5 5PM Oct 25

Lebanese ship which was to have been boarded turned  
back and therefore no ship had so far been boarded.

Pros: any incident should be avoided till we heard—  
prob. afternoon Oct 26 — whether & had accepted or rejected  
U.S.A. 2d proposal. Decision as to stopping taken hagraggy,  
if it continues, make them.

3 paths

#4, 10 AM Oct 25

Pres directed, instructions issued for selective investigation  
and boarding of non-bloc ships, excluding tankers.

[Zimmerman: Rely: a) non-bloc; b) satellite; c) Sov.

Armed forces in Cuba instructed to fire only in response to  
attack.

Pres: Bucharest, tanker, not to be interviewed for present.

DOD paper to intercept of approx. bloc ship Friday night.

Pres approved version of reply to USSR, but  
revised version approved by Pres at 1:15 pm

Pres asked for alternative courses of action for immediate  
future.

Martin assigned at 9:15 pm to do study on establishment  
of American Military Gov in Cuba.

Dillon paper: Scenarios for airstrike against offensive  
missiles bases and bombers in Cuba.

(Continued #4, 10 AM; discussed 5 PM,  
#5: discussed: military path, political path (who?) and an intermediate  
economic path)

~~#5~~ #6, 10 AM Oct 26

MCG called attention to civil defense problem; obtained  
agreement that no crash program would be undertaken  
immediately now,

Decision on migrant never deferred.

C. R. discussed political measures, including 24-48 hrs. Stevenson/  
UThant negotiations, an atom-free zone in L.A. and the proposed  
approach to Castro.

Amb. Stew. discussed immediate negot. with UThant, as well  
as the longer talks which would follow if agreement could be  
reached.

[Was approach made to Castro?]

10

Draft on Nuclear-free zones (25 Oct? revised 26)

Turkey must be included in ME nuc-free zone.

Sight have to withdraw weapons from Turkey  
to reduce threat of Cuban situation.

HBT: 10 AM Oct 27

McN recommended, Pres approved, 2 daylight recon today:  
morning and / this afternoon [undertaken?] Again  
recommended night recon tonight. In response to Rusk's  
request for delay of the mission, Pres said recon planes should  
go on alert, ... final decision this afternoon.

Agricel Russians would be informed of extent of  
generator zone privately. K could then decide whether to  
turn back low tanker Bragaznyj, which will <sup>be</sup> entering generator  
zone late today. If frag. continued, a decision could then be  
made as to whether it would be allowed to proceed to

start w

Hanova or whether it stopped, searched, & released,  
if as reported, it had on board no political material.  
A decision could also be arrived at as to what action should  
be taken if the tanka refused to submit to search.

4. At this point in the meeting the partial text of the  
Sov public statement was received. It became clear  
that the text of the public statement varied considerably  
from the proposals made by K in his personal letter to  
the Pres last night. Pres approved release of public statement,  
which was drafted during the meeting. A second and  
longer statement was to be prepared. (This was later  
abandoned).

Draft message to K was discussed and a final version  
will be completed for trans. this afternoon.

Decision to drop leaflets deferred.

# 8, typed

#10, NAM Oct 28

1. Full TASS text recd

2. McNamara Brayney was standing still and no other  
Bloc ships would be entering guarantee zone today.

3. Pres directed no air recon be flown today, no  
action be taken against Bloc ships today, but every  
effort made to get UV to fly recon mission Monday.

Classified info ~~intelligence~~ released to UN on  
<sup>officials</sup>

Sov amounts to facilitate inspection tasks.

Pres approved public statement indicating Sov decision to  
withdraw offensive weapons from Cuba. He agreed that  
we should not define offensive weapons to include bombers, but  
should not get hung up on this issue.

[Minutes essentially for action purposes?]

Pres directed letter to K be drafted.

# 13  
Oct 30

MCN reportedly had ordered that no U-2 planes fly until a satisfactory system was developed to safeguard against navigational errors resulting in overflying Soviet territory.

# 14 10 AM Oct 31

McC: photos of Oct 29 inconclusive.

R: Castro adamant w.r.t. inspection. Pres. conf. postponed.

Pres. recon to be flown tomorrow unless progress made in talks.

# 15 Oct 31, 8PM

R: unsatisfactory talk between UT and Castro.

tomorrow:

Pres: a) No U-2 flights

b) Up to 14 low-level sorties, but no plane would make more than one pass over each area. Pres said we were anxious to stop aerial surveillance as soon as OV provides a satisfactory substitute. He added this should be a matter

of priority with us because, if a US plane is shot down, we may have to take retaliatory measures.

Oct 24, 3:25

6 most interesting slips have turned back

Oct 24, 8:05 pm

10:30 pm Ball reads K letter to Pres. (put yourself in my place.)

Pres: Style are obviously not going to stop. He is stopping the ones he doesn't want us to have. I suppose we will have to stop there.

10:45 Pres. It seems to me that this record will be published. my two letters to him and his two to me.

This is a sympathetic appeal. Imagine what you would do if you were in my position. Who have we got around who can write a letter?

Ball: Cleared + yourself. We can do that.

Pros. It wouldn't have to be too long. "As I stated in my speech, now we know that these weapons are not being used. That is the reason we are taking this stand, and it is a source of right to me."

disc. of Budapest

11:15 Pros. (goes to request SU to hold slippery.)

11:35 pm: Buday: Pros thinks this one (letter) is the height of hypocrisy. (written at W.H.)  
(<sup>this</sup> Thompson: last para. signifies local contraction).

12:20 Stev: got US out of bed. dictated to him.

Buday:  
12:30 message to K: its your fault ad not ours on the basic ground that they misled us - the they we think we ought to get back into his what. The word of the law now is what caused the trouble.

Bundy reads reply to Ball.

Ball: There is only one very minor point, but I think it might be a major one. That is we use the offensive weapons; actually, my understanding is the conversation with Gromyko, that Gromyko was explicit that they had no weapons that could reach the U.S.

Bundy: He didn't say it that way.

Ball: I got this from the Secretary.

Bun: He didn't say it. At least, it did not appear in any transcript we had.

Ball: This may have been given by Dobrynin.

Bundy: It is true that Dobrynin said things of that the language is more precise than we can document to the Chairman.

Ball: Well, of course, his answer will be that they are not offensive.

Bundy: Well, he never said that actually.

Ball: The only thing that concerns me about the Stevenson thing  
is that he has probably given the opinion to C.S. that  
we will go further than we will go. That's what worries  
me.

Bandy: